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Issues in Semantic Memory
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Abstract
Glass and Holyoak (1975) have raised two issues related to the distinction
between set-theoretic and network theories of semantic memory. They contend
that: (a) their version of a network theory, the Marker Search model, is
conceptually and empirically superior to our version of a set-theoretic theory,
the Feature Comparison model; and (b) the contrast between set-theoretic and
network theories parallels distinctions in formal semantics that are concerned
with analyticity and binary truth values. We take issue with both of these
claims. We first argue that the set-theoretic vs. network distinction is
orthogonal to issues like analyticity and binary truth. Then we take up the
Marker Search and Feature Comparison models in detail. We raise objections
to some of the theoretical mechanisms postulated in the Marker Search model,
and then deal with Glass and Holyoak's criticisms of the Feature Comparison
model. Lastly, we present new experimental results that undermine the critical
empirical base for the Marker Search model.
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Issues in Semantic Memory:
A Response to Glass and Holyoak
In their paper on "Alternative Conceptions of Semantic Memory," Glass
and Holyoak (1975) raise a number of important issues concerning the psycho-
2
logical representation of meaning. Many of these issues revolve around a
distinction between set-theoretic and network models (Rips, Shoben & Smith,
1973), where the former class of models treats concepts as sets of semantic
elements, while the latter class represents concepts as nodes within a
network of labeled relations. With regard to this distinction, the major
points of Glass and Holyoak seem to be: (1) Network models may be superior
to set-theoretic ones, as suggested by a comparison of a specific set-
theoretic formulation, namely the Feature Comparison model (Smith, Shoben &
Rips, 1974), with a specific network proposal, the Marker Search model
(Glass and Holyoak); (2) This alleged superiority of network models has
definite implications for a number of well-known issues in the study of
formal semantics--such as whether the distinction between analytic and
synthetic truths is viable--because the set-theoretic vs. network dichotomy
is intimately related to these distinctions.
We wish to challenge both of these conclusions. In the next section of
this paper, we will argue that the "set-net" distinction is basically orthog-
onal to issues in formal semantics like the distinction between analytic and
synthetic truth. We will then go on to propose a different sort of taxonomy
of semantic memory models. In the third section, we will examine in detail
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Glass and Holyoak's contention that the Marker Search model is superior to
the Feature Comparison model. We will first offer some criticisms of the
general characteristics of the Marker-Search model, and then address our-
selves to some of the criticisms that Glass and Holyoak have made of the
Feature Comparison model. In the fourth section, we will consider the
experiments of Holyoak and Glass that, on the face of it, provide critical
disconfirmations of the Feature Comparison model. Here we will present some
new experimental findings that seriously qualify the Holyoak and Glass
results and lessen some of the major empirical problems of the Feature
Comparison model. A final section provides a summary and discussion of
future directions.
The Set-Net Distinction Reconsidered
What the Distinction is Not About
Representational differences. In surveying the semantic memory litera-
ture in 1973 (Rips et al.), we found that a single representational distinc-
tion seemed to capture many of the fundamental differences among contem-
porary models. Thus the models proposed by Schaeffer and Wallace (1970)
and Meyer (1970) had a set-theoretic structure, while the theories of Collins
and Quillian (1969) and Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman (1972) used a network
of labeled relations to represent meaning. Updating this list, one would
add the Feature Comparison model as another example of a set model, and HAM
(Anderson & Bower, 1973) and the Marker Search model as new instances of
network models. But while this distinction served an organizational purpose,
it soon became clear that the contrast between sets and nets might be a
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relatively superficial indicator of more important underlying differences.
This point was demonstrated by Hollan (1975) who simply noted that set models
can be recast as networks by connecting each element of the set to a common
node standing for the set itself.
What then can be said about our original partition of models? As we
have argued elsewhere (Rips, Smith & Shoben, 1975;), we still believe this
partition is useful since the set-net distinction correlated with some
important substantive differences among models. The task now becomes one
of specifying these differences. Glass and Holyoak, who accept our distinc-
tion, have proposed two possibilities. One is that set models have considered
rather simple representations and have not specified any relations among the
meaning components within a concept; in contrast, network theories are capable
of positing representations that stipulate entailment relations among a
concept's components. We do not wish to deal at length with this proposal,
but two points merit comment. Set models do not necessarily have to assume
simple semantic representations, and indeed we have introduced some additional
structure into set-theoretic representations (Smith, Rips & Shoben, 1974).
Similarly, while network models are capable of stipulating entailment rela-
tions among meaning components, not all network models inevitably do so, as
witnessed by aspects of Anderson and Bower's HAM model. Thus we think this
distinction is of limited value in capturing the substantive differences
between set and network theories.
Analyticity and formal vs. psychological semantics. Of greater concern
to the present paper is the second distinction proposed by Glass and Holyoak.
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This is their claim that set models are consistent with the view that cate-
gory membership and sentence truth value are continuous or graded, while
network models view category membership and truth as dichotomous. Given
this assumption, Glass and Holyoak proceed to align set models with both
Lakoff's (1972) advocacy of fuzzy semantics and Quine's (1953) skepticism
regarding the distinction between analytic and synthetic truth; net models,
in contrast, are seen as consistent with Katz's .(1972) defense of analyticity
and of two-valued truth. We disagree. As we see it, these important dis-
tinctions from formal semantics--analytic vs. synthetic truth and binary vs.
graded truth--may be orthogonal to those substantive psychological dif-
ferences that exist between the theories we have classified as set and net-
work models.
The distinction between analytic and synthetic statements comes from
philosophical semantics, and it is based on the relations among meaning
entities. A statement may be classified as analytic if the meaning asso-
ciated with the predicate is contained in that of the sentence subject, as
in A bachelor is unmarried. Otherwise, the statement must be classified as
synthetic. The analytic/synthetic distinction, then, rests on the nature of
meanings and their interrelations, and not in any direct way on psychological
representations. To make this point clearer, consider Frege's (1892) dis-
tinctions among the sense, reference, and idea of a word. While the sense of
a word is some abstract meaning entity, its reference is the set of real-
world entities denoted by the word, and its idea is roughly the psychological
representation of the word. Clearly the referent and psychological represen-
tation of a word are distinct, since psychological representations are by
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nature internal. Similarly, psychological representations cannot be equated
with senses either, at least on Frege's account. To use Frege's own analogy,
the sense of, say, moon is independent of anyone's representation of the moon
in the same way that the optical image of the moon in a telescope is indepen-
dent of observers' retinal images. By nature, then, theories of psychological
semantics must deal primarily with individuals' representations of meanings,
and not with the referents or senses themselves (Smith, Rips & Shoben, 1974).
This triptych of reference, sense, and representation has implications
for a number of the arguments made by Glass and Holyoak. First, we can
reject their claim that our Feature Comparison model, as presently stated,
is concerned with referential meaning. This point has no force at all since
our model is clearly about representations,not referents. (Indeed it is
difficult to imagine how any psychological model could be solely concerned
with reference.) Second, we can question their assertion that the Marker
Search model, unlike the Feature Comparison model, "...is directly concerned
only with sense relations" (p. 335). While psychologists may try to construct
representations that capture only sense relations, current semantic-memory
models, including the Marker Search model, have not done this. For example,
Glass and Holyoak have used their model to explain the confirmation of sen-
tences like Some women are writers, and such sentences clearly cannot be
verified by a consideration only of sense relations, on anyone's account of
sense. That is, the truth of our sample sentence is surely an empirical
matter, for there is nothing about the abstract meanings of women and writers
that prohibits the sentence from being false, and it is easy to imagine a
set of circumstances that would make this very sentence a false one. Third,
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our distinction among reference, sense, and representation allows us to make
some general points about analyticity and dichotomous truth in formal vs.
psychological semantics. For example, work in formal semantics indicates
that the truth value of a sentence can be determined by means of relations
between expressions of a language and their referents without mention of
psychological representations (Tarski, 1956); it is therefore possible to
adopt a binary truth-value system without implying that the psychological
representations of these truth-values are also necessarily binary. In prin-
ciple, then, one can endorse binary truth values in formal semantics, and
continuous truth in psychological semantics. In a similar way, since the
notion of analyticity can be defined in terms of the relations between the
senses of expressions in a sentence, without mention of psychological factors,
one can accept the analytic/synthetic distinction without implying that such
a distinction need be psychologically represented. In short, the questions
of whether truth values are binary and whether the analytic/synthetic dis-
tinction is tenable may be ontological questions, not psychological ones.
A more psychological approach to analyticity. While the tenability of
the analytic/synthetic distinction may not be a psychological question, there
is at least one aspect of this distinction that is psychological and of in-
interest to semantic memory. Granting that formal semantics provides a basis
for classifying sentences as analytic or synthetic, we may ask whether there
is a mental procedure that reliably picks out all those sentences and only
those sentences that have been classified as analytically true. This would
constitute a psychological distinction between analytic and synthetic state-
ments. But even given that such a procedure exists, the question arises of
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whether it is a critical difference between set and network models. That is,
only if all net models maintain a psychological distinction between analytic
and synthetic statements and all set models blur this distinction would there
then be support for the Glass and Holyoak proposal that the set-net distinc-
tion is chiefly about analyticity. However, an examination of existent models
indicates that the set-net distinction is not correlated with this
psychological-analyticity issue.
First, all semantic memory models, to our knowledge, have been applied
to both analytic and synthetic statements. As we have already noted, net
models, like the Marker Search theory, are intended as explanations of the
way we verify statements like Some women are writers, which are purely syn-
thetic, as well as analytically true statements like Some bachelors are un-
married. This is also true of the set theories proposed by Meyer (1970) and
Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974). This aspect of semantic-memory models is a re-
flection of the fact that the distinction between analytic and synthetic state-
ments is not equivalent to one between propositions considered part of semantic
memory and those thought to be a part of episodic memory (Smith, Rips & Shoben,
1974). Second, one may go on to ask whether an analytic/synthetic distinction
can be formulated within the framework of set or net models. This can cer-
tainly be done, and it seems to be no more difficult for one class of models
than for the other. In the case of network models, analytic statements might
Se r ovorable by restricting the relations in the network to those which are
true solely by virtue of the meaning of the concepts they connect. Similarly,
for set models, analytic statements are those that can be confirmed by means
of the semantic elements of features that are definitionally true of the
Issues in Semantic Memory
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associated terms. Exactly the same arguments can be applied to the relation
between binary truth values and the two classes of models we are considering.
Hence, neither analyticity nor binary truth can be used to distinguish between
set and network models, as Glass and Holyoak have proposed. As a consequence,
neither type of model can be construed as evidence pro or con particular
linguistic theories of semantics (e.g., Lakoff, 1972; Katz & Bever, 1975) that
take sides on issues concerning truth-value systems. These issues in
philosophy and linguistics, while important in their own right, are not at
this time helpful in distinguishing among rival psychological theories.
What the Set-Net Distinction is About
Computation vs. pre-storage models. What then are the critical dif-
ferences that divide set and network models? To get a grip on this problem,
let us take a look at two simple semantic memory models. Figure 1 presents
the Attribute theory, a set model described by Meyer (1970), along with
Collins and Quillian's (1969) Hierarchical theory, a typical network model.
Both were intended to account for the data obtained in a verification task.
In such a task, subjects must decide on the truth or falsity of simple state-
ments of the form An S is a P (where S designates a subject noun and P a
predicate noun), and the data of interest are the reaction times and error
rates. The Attribute model confirms a statement like A robin is a bird by
comparing the features of the predicate category to those of the subject cate-
gory, while in the Hierarchical model one verifies this statement by finding
an acceptable path that links subject and predicate categories.
Issues in Semantic Memory
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Insert Figure 1 about here
Note that in addition to their obvious representational differences,
the two models differ in a rather striking respect. In the network model
the proposition that a robin is a bird is represented directly in memory,
and confirmation of the sample statement involves finding the corresponding
proposition in memory. That is, the subset relation between robin and bird
is not represented directly, and consequently it must be computed during the
verification process. Since the differences just noted appear to hold for
all set and network models, it seems that a critical difference between the
two classes of theories is this: Network models posit that verification of
subset relations can occur by searching for pre-sorted propositions, while
set models assume that verification requires the computation of that relation.
We now need to specify a couple of boundary conditions on this Computa-
tion/Pre-storage dichotomy. First, no current network model of semantic
memory assumes that all verifiable statements are confirmed by finding the
corresponding proposition stored in memory. For such a position would imply
that if someone can verify that Julius Caesar was a living thing, he must
have at some time stored that exact proposition in memory. To avoid this
claim, network modelers allow some room for computations. They posit infer-
~nce routines that, when given stored propositions like Julius Caesar was a
person and A person is alive, use the transitivity of subset relations to
infer that Julius Caesar was a'living thing. Thus in the network model in
Figure 1, while the statements A robin is a bird or A bird is an animal would
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be confirmed by searching for the pre-stored propositions, confirmation of
A robin is an animal would involve an additional inference. Hence, all
semantic memory models involve some computations. But we will continue to
hold to our Computation/Pre-storage distinction since all network models
assume that at least some subset statements are stored as single units in
memory.
A second boundary condition concerns Computation models. In such models,
not all relations are computable, for some meaning components must be pre-
stored if the model is to compute anything. As an example, in the Attribute
model, the features are pre-stored with their respective categories; these
features can then be used to compute other relations, like the subset one.
Related distinctions. There are other distinctions that are correlated
with our Computation/Pre-storage dichotomy. From our description of the models
in Figure 1, it seems that the notion of a computation procedure leads to two
consequences. First, since one cannot operate on the terms robin and bird
directly, one must initially expand these terms into components that can be
operated on (Rips, Smith & Shoben, 1975). In the Attribute model, the terms
are expanded into sets of semantic features before any subsequent processing is
done. The computation models of Schaeffer and Wallace (1970) and Smith, Shoben,
and Rips (1974) also assume an initial expansion into semantic features, while
some of the Computation models considered by Meyer (1970) assume that subject
and predicate terms are first expanded into a list of exemplars of these terms,
or else into the names of other items that share exemplars with the subject
and predicate terms. In any event, all Computation theories assume some sort
Issues in Semantic Memory
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of semantic expansion of the terms presented, and this is in contrast to most
Pre-storage models.
The second consequence of positing a Computation procedure is that com-
parison processes are given a major role in verification (Rips, Smith & Shoben,
1975). In the Attribute model, once the subject and predicate terms have
been expanded into sets of semantic features, these two sets must be compared
to confirm that a subset relation holds between the two concepts. The notion
of comparison processes is central to all Computation theories, and most of
them further assume that variations in comparison processes are responsible
for many of the empirical effects obtained in experiments on verification.
While Pre-storage models also require comparison processes (so that the
relations in the retrieved proposition can be checked against those in the
test sentence), such processes play little role in the explanation of most
empirical findings. Rather, variations in search processes are thought to
underlie most findings of interest.
A third factor that correlates with the Computation/Pre-storage dichotomy
has arisen as simple semantic-memory models, like those of Figure 1, have been
revised to incorporate recent experimental results. For example, Rosch (1973)
and Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974) have found that the speed with which true
sentences can be confirmed depends on how typical the subject category is
of the predicate category. Thus, if apple is judged a more typical fruit
than strawberry, An apple is a fruit should take less time to verify than
A strawberry is a fruit. To cope with these results, network models have been
broadened to allow pathways to be differentially accessible, where accessi-
bility is determined by the co-occurrence frequency of the connected terms
Issues in Semantic Memory
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(Collins & Loftus, 1975; Glass & Holyoak). Set models have also been revised
by allowing the semantic features of a term to include those which charac-
terize the concept as well as those that strictly define it (Smith, Shoben &
Rips, 1974). Typicality effects are then explained on the basis of shared
characteristic features between subject and predicate concepts. Thus, in
explaining these typicality effects, a Computation model emphasizes a struc-
tural aspect, featural similarity, while a Pre-storage model stresses a func-
tional aspect, co-occurrence frequency. Although it may be possible for Pre-
storage models to incorporate a more structural account (see, e.g., Norman &
Rumelhart, 1975), most of these models attribute typicality effects to co-
occurrence frequency (Anderson & Bower, 1973; and the Marker Search model
of Glass and Holyoak).
In summary, we have proposed four distinctions. For two of these--the
Computation/Pre-storage contrast and the distinction based on semantic expan-
sion--we know of little relevant data. As for the relative emphasis on com-
parison vs. search processes, this is a difficult issue to address directly,
but it is related to Glass and Holyoak's recent experiments on disconfirming
false statements. We will consider the relevant data in the section entitled
"Experimental Studies of Disconfirmations" below. Lastly, we raised the issue
of featural similarity vs. co-occurrence frequency as a means of explaining
typicality effects. Here there are clearly pertinent data, and they will be
discussed in "Criticisms of the Marker Search and Feature Comparison Models"
below.
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Characterizations of the feature comparison and marker search models.
We now want to describe the Feature Comparison and Marker Search models in
detail and show how they may be characterized by the above distinctions. Let
us start with the Feature Comparison model. Its representational assumptions
are quite simple. Each lexical term carries with it a set of semantic
features. These vary continuously in the degree to which they confer category
membership, with features at one extreme being essential for defining the
concept, and features at the other extreme being only characteristic of the
concept. Thus the term bird would include as defining features the notions
that it is animate and feathered, and as characteristic features the notions
that birds are of a particular size and have certain predatory relations to
other animals (Rips et al., 1973; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974). More relevant
to our proposed distinctions are the processing assumptions of the model. It
is assumed that performance in a verification task is based upon a two-stage
process. The first stage compares all of the features of the subject and
predicate nouns in the test sentence, and assesses the degree of featural
similarity between the two terms. In this stage, no consideration is given
to whether the similar features are defining or only characteristic. It is
next assumed that if the featural similarity is either very high (as in robin
and bird) or very low (as in pencil and bird), then one can decide immed- ;
iately whether a subset relation exists between the two nouns. That is,
subject-predicate noun pairs with sufficiently high or low degrees of featural
similarity will be classified as true or false, respectively, without going
on to a second stage of processing. However, a second stage will be necessary
for subject-predicate pairs that have an intermediate level of similarity
Issues in Semantic Memory
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(as in penguin and bird, or bat and bird). The second stage considers only
the more defining features, and determines whether all of the defining
features of the predicate term match those of the subject term. This stage
is thus identical to the simple Attribute model.
Clearly this model is a Computational one. The model essentially pro-
poses that people have two ways of computing subset relations, where these
two ways correspond to the two stages. Decisions based on only the first
stage involve a heuristic computation, for such computations are rapid but
may sometimes be in error (i.e., when many of the similar features are charac-
teristic rather than defining). Decisions based on the second stage involve
an algorithmic computation, for such computations are slow but consider only
logically sufficient conditions. Both types of computation--heuristic and
algorithmic--are alike, however, in that they require expansion of the lexical
terms into underlying semantic features, and subsequent comparisons of these
feature sets. The two types of computation differ in that the heuristic
computation deals with characteristic as well as defining features. And it
is these characteristic features that allow the model to explain typicality
effects. That is, given that robin is judged to be a typical bird and
chicken an atypical one, robin will presumably share more of the character-
istic features of bird than will chicken. This will permit one to confirm
A robin is a bird by means of only the heuristic process whereas the confir-
mation of A chicken is a bird will also require the time-consuming algorithmic
computation. In sum, with regard to our distinctions, the Feature Comparison
model has all the aspects of a Computation model, and these distinctions
serve to elucidate certain of its key aspects.
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As for the Marker Search model, its representational assumptions are
more complex than any we have considered thus far. In the present model,
each lexical term is represented by markers, a notion borrowed from Katz's
(1972) theory of semantics. While Glass and Holyoak suggest that markers
can be thought of as properties, in their own examples common words are
directly associated with only a single marker. Thus the terms bird, chicken,
and robin, are represented by the defining markers <avian>, <chicken>, and
<robin>, respectively, where, for example, the marker <robin> would be
characterized as "possessing the essential properties of a robin." A second
representational assumption is that markers are interrelated so that one
marker dominates or implies a set of other markers. As an example, <robin>
implies <avian> which in turn implies <animate>, where the latter is the
marker for animal. This implicational structure, which is intended to capture
Katz's (1972) idea of redundancy rules, is ullustrated in Figure 2. There it
Insert Figure 2 about here
can be seen that the upshot of these assumptions is a semantic network similar
to that of the Hierarchical model. However, further assumptions serve to
distinguish the present theory from the Hierarchical one. The third repre-
sentational assumption of the Marker Search model is that the hierarchical
connections may sometimes be shortcut by direct pathways between nonadjacent
markers. This is exemplified in Figure 2 by the shortcut path between
<chicken> and <animate>. The final representational assumption is that
information about contradictions is represented directly in the semantic
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network. Specifically, a contradiction arises whenever two paths with the
same label meet at the same marker, e.g., in Figure 2 <chicken> and <robin>
contradict at <avian>.
The processing assumptions of the model are based on the notion that
performance in a verification task is determined by a search of the semantic
network. When a statement of the form An S is a P is presented, the subject
accesses the defining markers of the two nouns and all other markers they
imply or are implied by. In essence, this specifies a target section of the
semantic network. This section is then searched, and the subject responds
True as soon as he finds an acceptable path between the markers of the subject
and predicate terms. Hence the time needed to confirm a true statement
depends on the time it takes to find an acceptable path. This is just as it
was in the Hierarchical model. However, unlike the Hierarchical model, if
the shortcut path between <chicken> and <animate> is searched before the path
between <chicken> and <avian>, the subject should be relatively quick in
confirming A chicken is an animal, but relatively slow in confirming
A chicken is a bird. Shortcut paths, then, provide a means of accounting for
typicality effects. In a similar fashion, the subject responds False as soon
as he finds a contradictory path between either (a) the defining markers of
the subject and predicate terms (as in A robin is a chicken--see Figure 2),
or (b) the defining marker of the predicate and a marker which implies the
defining marker of the subject (as in A bird is a robin, where <chicken> both
implies <avian> and contradicts <robin>--see Figure 2).
The above model is basically of the Pre-storage variety, as many
propositions are represented directly in the network. Little expansion of
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terms is needed for verification; rather, verification is a matter of
searching for direct or indirect connections, or of searching for two connec-
tions that contradict one another. In all of these cases the critical deter-
minants of verification times are the number of links in the pathways between
markers and the order in which these pathways are searched. Thus, typicality
and related effects can be explained in terms of the order in which certain
shortcut paths are searched. That is, the probability that a particular
shortcut exists, as well as ýts priority in the search order, increases with
the co-occurrence frequency of the terms involved. Hence this theory differs
from the Feature comparison model with respect to all of our proposed distinc-
tions. The two models, then, should lead to different empirical consequences,
and the next two sections of this paper are largely concerned with a com-
parison of the models with respect to certain empirical findings.
Criticisms of the Marker Search and Feature Comparison Models
The Glass and Holyoak paper contains (a) a detailed critique of the
Feature Comparison model, and (b) a presentation of their own Marker Search
model. In this section, we will first point out two potentially serious
problems with the Marker Search model, and then attempt to rebut some of the
criticisms of our own theory.
A Criticism of the Marker Search Model
In essence, the Marker Search model accounts for the existant data on
disconfirmations by its notion of a contradiction, and for the data on con-
firmations by its ideas about the role of co-occurrence frequency in
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determining short-cut paths and search order. We think both of these notions
have their difficulties, as detailed below.
Contradictions: The encoding of negative information. The most impor-
tant contribution of the Marker Search model is the way it handles false
sentences, traditionally a problem for Pre-storage theories (see, e.g., Collins
& Quillian, 1972; Anderson & Bower, 1973, chap. 12). As we have noted, the
Marker Search model disconfirms statements by searching for tags on pathways
that indicate two or more markers are contradictory. Although Glass and
Holyoak have been hesitant to say exactly when two markers are contradictory,
the only reasonable assumption seems to be that contradictory tags indicate
which subsets of a common superordinate are disjoint (see Collins & Loftus,
1975). For example, the identically labeled paths from <chicken> and <robin>
that intersect at <avian> in Figure 2 indicate that chickens and robins are
disjoint subsets of birds. To see how this contradiction mechanism works
in detail, it is convenient first to translate the language of Glass and
Holyoak into more standard terminology. Accordingly, there are two ways of
disconfirming statements in the model, one for sentences in which the subject
and predicate categories are disjoint (e.g., All robins are chickens), and
another for sentences where either the subject category is a superior of the
predicate (e.g., All birds are robins) or the subject category partially
overlaps the predicate one (e.g., All birds are pets). Disjoint statements
are disconfirmed by searching for identically labeled links to a superordinate
shared by the subject and predicate. For example, in disconfirming All robins
are chickens, the subject locates paths from <robin> to <avian> and from
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<chicken>to <avian> that have the same tag (see Figure 2). In contrast,
superset or overlap statements are disconfirmed by searching for a subset
category that is itself disjoint with the predicate category. For example,
in disconfirming All birds are robins, a person must locate a subset of
<bird> (e.g., <chicken>), and then determine that this subset is disjoint
with <robin>, just as in the previous example.
While such a Pre-storage model for false sentences is a clear advance on
earlier proposals, it is still possible to ask whether it is complete in the
sense of being able to disconfirm all those sentences that we know to be false
on semantic grounds. A consideration of some specific cases suggests it is
not, and the simplest such example is illustrated in Figure 3a. Here we have
four subsets (A, B, C, and D) of a single superordinate, S, such that A and B
partially overlap, as do C and D. We indicate these set relations in
Insert Figure 3 about here
Figure 3a by a Venn diagram superimposed on the network structure. Given
such a structure we can begin to label the paths, following the procedure
that mutually exclusive subordinates of the same superordinate have the same
labels. Since A and B partially overlap, they must have differently labeled
paths to their superordinates, for if the tags were identical we would have
evidence that A and B were disjoint. We indicate the overlapping status of
A and B by placing a on the A-S path and 13 on the B-S path. Now however, we
must decide how to label C-S and D-S. Using the rule that disjoint cate-
gories are indicated by the same tag, C-S must be labeled ac since A and C
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are disjoint by hypothesis. But if so, C-S and B-S will now have different
labels, which indicates that B and C are not disjoint, according to our
labeling procedure. This, however, contradicts our original assumption about
the set relation between categories.
Clearly something is wrong with the original labeling rule, and we
must consider other alternatives. One way out for the Marker Search model is
to define away such a situation. For example, the model might posit that,
for any overlapping categories (e.g., A and B), a new superordinate node,
S', is formed together with the connections A-S', B-S', and S'-S, and that
connections between A or B and S are disallowed. The resulting structure is
illustrated in Figure 3b, labeled in a way consistent with our procedure.
However, there are two major disadvantages to this modification. First, it
posits memory nodes for no other reason than to bail out the model. We would
need some evidence that such nodes actually represent concepts that play some
substantive role in semantic memory. Second, the proposed modification
prohibits the use of shortcut pathways in such situations. But we have seen
that these shortcuts are warranted on other grounds, and are in fact a major
structural assumption of the model.
However, there is a second possible way out of the present difficulties
that we can explore. Suppose we allow multiple labels on a single path, so
that C-S can be tagged by both a and $. If we assume that paths sharing at
least one tag indicate disjoint subsets, then the structure in Figure 3c
correctly reflects the relationships among A, B, and C. But we still have
the C-S path to consider. If we label it with a or B, in order to show that
D is disjoint with A or B, then D-S will also share labels with C-S. But
Issues in Semantic Memory
22
this means that D and C are disjoint sets according to our rule, and this
contradicts the original hypothesis that C and D partially overlap. Our
second way out has therefore led to only deeper difficulties, and so we have
come up with no way in which the Marker Search model can provide an a priori
basis for deciding when two paths have the same label.
In the course of our preceding arguments, we noted that the Marker
Search model's provision for shortcut paths may, under certain assumptions,
conflict with the method used to store negative information. A second way
in which this conflict may arise is depicted in Figure 4, using an example
Insert Figure 4 about here
along the lines of Figure 2. In this diagram we have indicated the shortcut
pathways between the nodes <canary> and <animate> and between <chicken> and
<animate> by dotted lines. What is crucial here is the labeling of the paths
terminating at <animate>. To indicate that <chicken> and <canary> denote
disjoint subsets of animals, we have given both shortcut paths the label a.
It follows that the <avian>-<animate> path must possess a different label
(here, f3) since neither <avian> and <canary> nor <avian> and <chicken> are
disjoint subsets. But, then, what label should be used for the <mammalian>-
<animate> path? The problem is similar to that raised with respect to
Figure 3a. For if we use a in order to indicate that <mammalian> is disjoint
from <chicken> and <canary>, we can no longer represent the fact that <avian>
and <mammalian> are disjoint. Similarly, if we use 3, we lose the ability
to indicate that <canary> and <mammalian> and <chicken> and <mammalian> also
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represent disjoint sets. Finally, as we have seen in the previous paragraph,
using both ac and 1 for the <mammalian>-<animate> path leads directly to
further problems. It appears, therefore, that we must either prohibit
disconfirmations on the basis of shortcut paths, or restrict or eliminate
such paths entirely. Both possibilities violate the structural assumptions
of the Marker Search model.
The problems associated with the structures in Figures 3 and 4 should
not be taken to mean that it is impossible to store information about which
subsets intersect and which are disjoint. Rather our demonstrations show
only that the storage of negative information may not be as simple as markers
on paths, as Glass and Holyoak's formalisms seem to suggest. It remains to
be seen whether negative information can be incorporated into Pre-storage
models in a way that is both theoretically parsimonious and consistent with
experimental evidence. We note, by way of contrast, that such problems are
not encountered by Computation models, since here the storage of negative
information is unnecessary. Rather, negative decisions are made whenever
defining features of predicate concepts mismatch those of subject concepts,
as we have seen in terms of the Attribute and Feature Comparison models. We
count this theoretical parsimony as a virtue of Computation models in general.
The role of co-occurence frequency. As we have noted, co-occurence fre-
quency plays a central role in the Marker Search model, as in other Pre-
storage theories of semantic memory. Co-occurrence frequency determines
what shortcut paths are formed as well as the order in which paths are
searched, and these two factors, determine all of the empirical predictions
from the model. That is, given co-occurrence frequencies, one should be able
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to deduce the ordinal relations among reaction times for the verification of
any set of true or false sentences. However, no norms of co-occurrence
frequency have yet been published, and for this reason predictions from the
Marker Search model have been generated from other, more readily available
data. .In particular, Glass and Holyoak rely on the frequency with which
subjects produce a predicate noun when given a sentence frame containing the
subject noun. For example, raters may be asked to complete the frame All birds
are ? with a noun that will make the sentence true; the frequency with which
a group of raters produce a particular predicate noun (e.g., animals) is then
taken as an estimate of the co-occurrence frequency of the subject-predicate
pair (e.g., of the birds-animals pair).
In an earlier paper (Smith, Rips & Shoben, 1974) we argued that co-
occurrence frequency may not offer a satisfactory explanation of semantic
phenomena because co-occurrence is itself determined in part by semantic
factors. Thus, the words which appear in the present sentence co-occur
because of the meaning relations they bear to one another and not because of
the frequency with which they have been grouped. Frequency, therefore, may
have the status of an epiphenomenon.
This anti-frequency argument is strengthened by reaction time effects
with unfamiliar stimuli where co-occurrence frequency cannot be a factor.
These effects must be attributed to structural aspects of the stimulus domain
itself. Evidence on this score comes from a series of experiments by Rosch,
Simpson, and Miller (1976), who used sets of dot patterns, stick figures, and
letter strings as stimuli. To illustrate the critical findings, consider the
case where letter strings were employed. Subjects first learned to classify
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12 individual strings into two disjoint categories, and then were given a
reaction time task in which they pressed one of two buttons depending on the
category of a presented item. Finally, the subjects were asked either to
rate the typicality of each of the instances, or to produce as many items as
possible from each category. The strings themselves had been generated by
varying the number of letters that a given string shared with other members
of its category, and this variable (number of shared letters) determined all
performance measures. Instances with more letters in common were learned in
fewer trials, were classified faster, and had higher typicality ratings and
production frequency than their counterparts. Similar results were obtained
even when the less typical items were presented more frequently during initial
learning. In this way, Rosch et al. reproduced the usual typicality effects
varying only the internal properties of the stimulus domain, and this suggests
that co-occurrence frequency may not be a necessary factor in determining
typicality effects even in semantic-memory studies.
Co-occurrence frequency may not be a sufficient cause of typicality
effects either, but to investigate this, we need a reliable index of co-
occurrence frequency. The problem with the usual indices--production fre-
quencies, as in Glass and Holyoak, or ratings of how often two terms seem to
occur together, as in Anderson and Reder (1974)--is that they may be deter-
mined by semantic factors, as we noted earlier. There is, however, one index
available that has the potential for providing an objective measure of co-
occurrence frequency, the Kucera and Francis (1967) corpus of written American
English (not to be confused with their simple word frequency counts). From
this corpus we can tabulate the number of times an instance and its appropriate
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category term appear together, which gives us a relatively direct measure of
the kind of frequency we are interested in. In what follows, we will refer
to this measure as the KF count.
The existence of the KF count allows us to assess certain claims about co-
occurrence frequency and typicality effects. Suppose that: (1) co-occurrence
frequency is indeed a sufficient cause of typicality effects, and (2) pro-
duction frequencies and co-occurrence ratings are good estimates of objective
co-occurrence frequency. Then it follows that: (3) the KF count should cor-
relate with typicality effects, and (4) the KF count should correlate with
production frequencies and co-occurrence ratings. Suppose instead that:
(1') co-occurrence frequency is not a determinant of typicality effects, and
(2') production frequencies and co-occurrence ratings primarily reflect
semantic factors. Then it follows that: (3') the KF count should not
correlate with typicality effects, and (4') the KF count should not correlate
with either production frequencies or co-occurrence ratings, though the latter
two indices should correlate with themselves as well as with typicality
ratings.
To test these contrasting sets of predictions we used the data previously
collected by Anderson and Reder (1974). These investigators collected re-
action times (RTs) in a task where subjects were presented word pairs (e.g.,
turnip-vegetable), and had to decide whether the first item was a subset of
tes-ecornd. In addition to the RT data, Anderson and Reder also collected co-
occurrence ratings ("how frequently do these two terms co-occur together?")
and typicality ratings ("how typical is the instance of the category?").
This list of factors gives us everything we need to test our contrasting
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predictions, except for production frequencies and KF counts. To obtain
production frequencies, we used the norms collected by Battig and Montague
(1969), who had subjects produce as many instances of given categories as they
could in a 30 sec interval. Thirty-six of the 40 category terms used by
Anderson and Reder correspond closely to categories in the Battig and Montague
4
norms, and we will confine our subsequent analysis to these common categories.
Finally, we obtained our KF counts by defining an instance-category co-
occurrence as the appearance of both terms within two lines of coded text
(70 characters per line).
To test the contrasting sets of predictions, we simply carried out
correlational analyses on the five factors mentioned: True RTs, typicality
ratings, co-occurrence ratings, production frequencies, and KF counts.
Consider our first set of predictions, where true co-occurrence (estimated by
the KF count) supposedly determines typicality effects, as well as co-
occurrence ratings and production frequencies. Contrary to predictions, the
KF count did not correlate at all with True RTs, r(70) = .00, and correlated
only marginally with co-occurrence ratings, r(70) = .23, and production
frequencies, r(70) = .22, .05 < p < .10 in both cases. Thus the results offer
little support for our first set of predictions, and are in far better agree-
ment with our second set. Recall that in the latter, the KF count was not
expected to correlate with RTs, co-occurrence ratings, or production fre-
quencies, while all subject-generated measures were expected to be inter-
correlated. In fact, all three subject-generated measures were substantially
intercorrelated. Co-occurrence ratings correlated highly with production
frequencies, r(70) = .66 p < .01, and with typicality ratings, r(70) = .70,
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p < .01, while production frequencies and typicality ratings were themselves
intercorrelated, r(70) = .63, p < .01.
The above findings, then, favor our second set of predictions and the
hypotheses that generated them: true co-occurrence frequency does not deter-
mine typicality, and subject-generated estimates of this factor reflect
semantic factors. But there is reason to be cautious in drawing these con-
clusions. For our KF counts may be limited by the relatively small number of
times our instance-category pairs actually appeared together in the Kucera
and Francis corpus. However, there is an additional result in the literature
suggesting that the KF count is not positively correlated with True RTs. This
is the finding of Rosch et al. (1976) that for a completely different set of
items, the KF count was negatively correlated with ratings of typicality;
given this, and the fact that highly typical items are responded to quickly,
it seems most unlikely that co-occurrence frequency is the cause of rapid
responding to typical items. But still, until more work is done with the KF
count, we shall have to settle for a cautious conclusion: There is no
evidence that typicality effects are caused by co-occurrence frequency when
this factor is measured by a relatively objective index. 5
Even this weak conclusion leaves the Marker Search model (and all other
Pre-storage models) without a theoretical explanation of the well-documented
relations between RTs on the one hand, and typicality ratings and production
frequencies on the other. This is in contrast to the Feature Comparison model,
model, where featural similarity is assumed to be responsible for the effects
of typicality ratings and production frequencies on True RTs. On this view,
all of the subject-generated measures we discussed above are based on featural
similarity, and that is why they are all correlated with True RTs, as well as
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with one another. Furthermore, there are two pieces of evidence that
directly link featural similarity to typicality ratings. First, Rips et al.
(1973) showed that the features derived from a multidimensional scaling of a
set of animal terms can predict typicality effects in semantic memory tasks
(see also Shoben's subsequent scaling work, discussed in Smith, Rips, and
Shoben, 1974). Second, there is the Rosch et al. (1976) study described
earlier, where explicit variation in featural similarity induced concomitant
variations in typicality ratings, as well as in production frequencies and
RTs.
Criticisms of the Feature Comparison Model
In their paper, Glass and Holyoak refer to several sources of difficulty
with the Feature Comparison model, apart from those problems associated with
the Holyoak and Glass data. Some of these criticisms are concerned mainly
with the evidence in support of the model presented in Smith, Shoben, and Rips,
(1974). However, other remarks are addressed to the more general question of
whether the Feature Comparison model is, in principle, able to account for
verification of sentences other than subset statements. Both problems are
obviously important ones, if they can be substantiated, and we deal with them
in the following.
Can the Feature Comparison model be extended? According to Glass and
Holyoak, the Feature Comparison model is inherently unable to encode relational
information such as the notion of possession expressed by have in Elephants
have ears. If so, the model could not explain how such statements are verified,
and in addition, would have difficulty in accounting for the meanings of words
that have relational components as part of their definition. But this supposed
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limitation to non-relational components has never been part of the Feature
Comparison model. Indeed, in an earlier paper (Smith, Rips & Shoben, 1974),
we discussed sentences like the above example in some detail, as well as other
sentence types commonly used in semantic memory (e.g., An ostrich is large).
To rehearse our proposal concerning has, a predicate like has ears can be
represented by an ordered pair, where the first member includes the semantic
features of the verb (perhaps a single feature, has-as-a-part), and the second
contains the feature list of the predicate noun. In verifying such a sentence,
one would compare the features of the subject category to the representation of
the predicate just described; if the subject category's features contain those
of the compound predicate then the sentences will be true, and otherwise false.
Thus, according to the model, sentences containing relational information can be
encoded and, further, relational components can be part of the analysis of indi-
vidual terms. In fact, in a new series of experiments, we have shown that the
mechanics of the Feature Comparison model can be used to predict reaction times
for the verification of sentences containing has (Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1975).
This, however, does not absolve the Feature Comparison model of all
theoretical difficulties. It is merely that the problems faced by the model
are not different in kind from those surrounding theories like the Marker Search
model. As Glass and Holyoak acknowledge, these difficulties concern the way
such models can be constrained so as to provide a principled account of
semantic phenomena. For Pre-storage models, this comes down to specifying
boundary conditions on permissible nodes and relations, as well as limits on
the types of search procedures that can be employed. For Computation models,
similar constraints must be established on the semantic components and
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comparison processes. Thus the problem is not one of the generality of these
models, but rather one of accounting for experimental data in other than an
ad hoc fashion.
The empirical status of the Feature Comparison model. After a review of
the relevant evidence, Glass and Holyoak conclude that there is little experi-
mental evidence to support the processing assumptions of the Feature Comparison
model. Their reasoning is as follows. The Feature comparison model identifies
two factors that should, theoretically, influence RT; these include ratings of
semantic relatedness, which should affect the first stage, and category size,
which should affect the second stage. Neither factor, according to Glass and
Holyoak, has been shown unambiguously to determine RTs, and therefore, no
unambiguous evidence for the Feature Comparison model exists.
These variables are important to the model, and a lack of evidence for
them would indeed undermine the theory. Let us first consider the evidence
for the effects of relatedness on semantic decisions. As Glass and Holyoak
acknowledge, a large number of studies can be construed as showing effects of
relatedness (e.g., Loftus, 1973; Meyer, 1970; Rips et al., 1973; Rips, Shoben
& Smith, 1975; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Wilkins, 1971). But Glass and
Holyoak argue that: (a) Ratings of semantic relatedness are sometimes less
accurate predictors of RT than are production frequences (Smith, Shoben &
Rips, 1974), suggesting that production frequency, not rated relatedness, is
the key factor; and (b) Certain findings are more plausibly explained on the
basis of search order than shared features (Glass, Holyoak & O'Dell, 1974;
Loftus, 1973), again suggesting the importance of production frequencies
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(supposedly measures of search order) over that of relatedness (supposedly a
measure of shared features).
We have already considered the issue of relatedness vs. production
frequency when we reanalyzed the results of Anderson and Reder (1974). There
we found that the correlation of RT with relatedness (typicality) was actually
slightly higher, though nonsignificantly so, than the correlation with pro-
duction frequency (see Footnote 5). Previously, however, we have found one
case where production frequency was a better predictor of RT than was semantic
relatedness (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974, Experiment 1). So we have something
of a discrepancy between these experiments with regard to whether a rating of
relatedness or production frequency is the better predictor of RTs. This
discrepancy may be due to any of a number of differences between the two
experiments. However, even if production frequency was consistently superior
to rated relatedness in predicting RTs, we believe that this would say little
about the underlying mechanisms (search order vs. shared features) responsible
for the RT effects. This is because production frequency norms are generally
collected with subjects under speed pressure, just as they are in standard RT
tasks. Consequently, extrinsic factors that affect all speeded tasks (e.g.,
factors that influence stimulus encoding) will increase the correlation be-
tween production frequency and RT. By contrast, subjects are usually not
timed as they make relatedness judgments and are therefore uninfluenced by
such extrinsic variables. For this reason, we might expect lower correlations
between RT and relatedness than between RT and production frequency even if
both ratings and frequencies were principally determined by shared semantic
Issues in Semantic Memory
33
features. In view of such considerations, the relative size of the correla-
tions in question seems like an unimportant issue.
The second question concerning the role of semantic relatedness is
whether this variable is sufficient to explain certain problematic findings.
One set of findings (by Glass et al., 1974; and by Holyoak and Glass) exhibit
cases in which reaction time decreases with relatedness for false sentences, a
result that is contrary to the Feature Comparison model's predictions. We
will discuss this evidence in the next section. The second kind of experi-
mental evidence that seems counter to the Feature Comparison model is Loftus'
(1973) demonstration of asymmetries between verifying that an instance is a
category member and verifying that a category is the superordinate of an
instance. For example, it is easier to verify that insect is a superordinate
of the previously presented instance butterfly than to decide that butterfly
is an instance of the previously presented superordinate insect. By contrast,
it is easier to decide that shrimp is an instance of seafood (seafood pre-
sented first) than that seafood is the superordinate of shrimp (shrimp pre-
sented first). If RT is determined by relatedness, and if relatedness is
itself a matter of shared features, why should such asymmetries arise?
There are, however, a number of ways to explain Loftus' result that are
fully in keeping with the Feature Comparison model. First, we note that
according to the original formulation of the model, the relatedness value
computed in the first stage is based not on the number of shared features
between instance and category, but on the proportion of the category's
features that are shared (see Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974). While this account
was intended to apply to situations in which the instance and category were
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presented simultaneously, it seems reasonable to suppose that when the items
are presented in sequence, as in the Loftus experiment, relatedness should be
determined by the proportion of shared features of whichever term is presented
first. The two proportions need not be equal, of course, for they will depend
on the-total number of defining and characteristic features in the term pre-
sented first.
A second explanation of Loftus' result is to assume that when the super-
ordinate (e.g., insect) is presented first, subjects attempt to generate
possible instances in anticipation of the to-be-presented instance. Similarly,
when an instance (e.g., butterfly) is presented first, subjects generate
possible superordinates. Whether subjects are successful in anticipating the
correct item will depend on two factors: (a) the instance-superordinate
relatedness, and (b) the number of alternative items with higher relatedness
than the correct one. We can thus explain the asymmetry between butterfly-
insect and insect-butterfly by appealing to the (b) factor. That is, there
are more insect-instances with higher relatedness values than butterfly, than
there are butterfly-superordinates with higher relatedness than insect. For
the seafood-shrimp example, this ordering with respect to the (b) factor
reverses. Again, instance-category asymmetries are not inconsistent with the
Feature Comparison model.
The second factor questioned by Glass and Holyoak is category size.
Category size predictions arise from the Feature Comparison model's second
stage, where the defining features of the predicate are compared to those of
the subject noun. The total number of the predicate's defining features
should therefore determine second stage duration according to most serial and
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parallel mechanisms. If we further assume, with Meyer (1970) and Clark (1970),
that larger categories are likely to have fewer defining features than their
subordinates, it follows that the duration of the second stage should decrease
with increasing predicate size. For example, the time to complete the second
stage should be greater for A bee is an insect than for A bee is an animal.
It is difficult, however, to test this prediction directly for two reasons.
First, a simple change in the category size of the predicate is not sufficient,
since such a change is likely to alter the subject-predicate relatedness and
hence the probability that the second stage is even executed. Second, the
second-stage difference that we are interested in may not occur on every trial;
this is because some responses will always be made after only first-stage
processing for there is as yet no experimental technique that ensures second-
stage processing on every trial.
In view of these obstacles to a direct test of our category-size pre-
diction, we attempted to assess it indirectly. In one attempt (Smith, Shoben
& Rips, 1974, Experiment 1), we varied the size of the predicate categories
in a standard verification task. Here, we used an analysis of covariance to
eliminate any effects that category size might have had on relatedness.
Contrary to predictions, we found no significant residual effect of category
size when RTs were corrected in this way. In retrospect, this failure of the
category size hypothesis seems surprising. The mathematical model presupposed
by the analysis of covariance is not equivalent to that of the mathematical
version of the Feature Comparison model itself, and so there is no guarantee
that estimates of the category-size effects from the two mathematical pro-
8
cedures will coincide. In order to derive estimates of category-size effects
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from the mathematical version of the Feature Comparason model, we performed a
second verification experiment and fit the model explicitly to the results
(Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974, Experiment 2). In this case the duration of the
second stage for large categories (animal and plant) was calculated to be 161
msec, while the estimate for small categories (bird, insect, fruit, and vege-
table) was 280 msec. So, as predicted, larger predicate categories were
processed faster in the second stage. It should be noted that the model-
fitting procedure itself did not constrain the former value to be smaller than
the latter, so that these results constitute a confirmation of the underlying
theory.
The parameter values just described were obtained by using error rates to
help predict reaction times, following the procedure outlined by Atkinson and
Joula (1974). This procedure has been criticized by Glass and Holyoak who
claim that it trades on a general positive correlation between errors and RTs.
However, several points can be made in response to this. First, recent evi-
dence suggests that high positive correlations between errors and RTs are far
from universal (Pachella, 1974). Second, even if this correlation were a
truly general one, it is irrelevant in evaluating the crucial parameters of
the model. Clearly, high correlations between errors and RTs imply nothing
about the parameter values for the second stage that were discussed above.
Finally, Smith, Shoben, and Rips also used a second procedure to predict the
obtained data. In this procedure, error rates as well as RTs were predicted
only from relatedness ratings. Here, there is no way we could have traded on
a general positive correlation between errors and RTs, yet we still found that
the estimated duration of the second stage was less for larger predicate
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categories (245 msec) than for smaller ones (311 msec). Thus, there is in
fact some evidence that the size of the predicate category affects semantic
decisions. Such evidence fits nicely with the Computation models that assume
semantic decisions are based on a comparison of features, with fewer features
resulting in shorter comparison times. In contrast, it is not at all clear
how Pre-storage theories like the Marker Search model would account for these
results.
Experimental Studies of Disconfirmations
It remains for us to account for the empirical results of Holyoak and
Glass on disconfirmation times, which, taken at face value, violate a major
prediction of the Feature Comparison model. There are actually two sets of
findings of interest, one concerning the disconfirmation of disjoint state-
ments, the other concerning the disconfirmation of superset and overlap
statements. We deal with each in turn.
Disconfirming Disjoint Statements
The Holyoak and Glass results. Using a standard verification paradigm,
Holyoak and Glass presented subjects with 39 disjoint sentences of the form
All S are P and 39 of the form Some S are P, in addition to other sentences
that are irrelevant to the present issue. The 78 false sentences were sub-
divided by Holyoak and Glass into three types: high-production frequency,
low-production frequency, and anomalous statements. These distinctions were
based on an earlier experiment in which subjects were asked to generate com-
pletions for the sentence frames All S are ? and Some S are ? such that
the resulting sentences were false. Holyoak and Glass then tabulated the
production frequencies for these false completions. According to a
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straightforward interpretation of the Marker Search theory, the frequency
with which a particular completion is produced should reflect the amount of
time necessary to disconfirm the corresponding sentence. For example, the
production frequerncyof men to the frames All women are ? should predict the
time needed to disconfirm All women are men, since completing frames involves
finding a contradiction that is also used to disconfirm the statement in the
verification task. Thus, high-frequency completions (produced by a mean of
35% of their 14 subjects) should be disconfirmed faster than low-frequency
completions (produced by 5%), and these in turn should be falsified faster
than anomalous completions (4%). Note, however, that the difference in
production frequency between low and anomalous sentences is slight.
Holyoak and Glass also obtained ratings of semantic relatedness for each
of the disjoint subject-predicate pairs, and this allows us to generate rival
predictions from the Feature Comparison model. These ratings show that the
high-frequency sentences were somewhat more closely related than low-
frequency sentences, and that low-frequency sentences were much more closely
related than anomalous ones; the means were 4.88, 4.47, and 1.76, on a 7-point
scale, for high, low, and anomalous sentences, respectively. Since the Feature
Comparison model predicts that disconfirmation times should increase with
relatedness, the high-frequency statements should take the longest to dis-
confirm, the low-frequency next longest, and the anomalous statements should
be the fastest. This, of course, is the exact opposite of the ordering pre-
dicted by the marker Search model.
The results of this experiment disconfirmed major predictions of both
models. First, contrary to the Feature Comparison model, low-frequency
sentences took longer to disconfirm than the high-frequency ones. And second,
Issues in Semantic Memory
39
contrary to both theories, anomalous sentences took about the same amount
of time as high-frequency sentences. Before commenting on an interpretation
of these results, it seems important to inquire about their robustness.
Since these findings are surprising ones, we decided to replicate them.
Experiment 1: A partial replication of Holyoak and Glass. We attempted
to replicate the part of Holyoak and Glass's experiment that dealt with dis-
joint statements quantified by All, making only minor changes in procedure
and design. We used a total of 132 word-pairs. Two sets of 39 pairs were
selected from Holyoak and Glass. These sets comprised the disjoint state-
ments and their true counterparts that were quantified by All in Holyoak and
Glass. Our remaining 54 pairs were used as fillers to control for frequency
of nouns in true vs. false items, such that: (1) all subject nouns were
presented equally often in true and false items; and (2) approximately one-
third of the predicate nouns appeared in a true item only, one-third in a
false item only, and the remaining third once in both a true and false item.
Only the 78 pairs selected from Holyoak and Glass were analyzed.
The two members of a pair were typed in uppercase Gothic in a single
line (and were separated by a hyphen) on a 6" x 9" white index card. Subjects
were instructed that a pair was to be considered True if the left-hand member
was a subset of the right-hand one, and False otherwise. Twenty of the filler
pairs were selected as practice items while the remaining 112 pairs were
randomly ordered. The same order was used for all 20 subjects, who were
Stanford undergraduates. The pairs were presented in a Gerbrands two-field
tachistoscope at a viewing distance of 59 cm and each pair was preceded by
a 1.5 sec fixation point. Responses were made on two telegraph keys, which,
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when depressed, terminated the display of the pair and a Standard Electric
Timer. The assignment of keys to response types (True and False) was balanced
over subjects.
In analyzing the results, RTs to the critical 78 pairs were analyzed
across both items and subjects (Clark, 1973), which separate analyses for True
and False responses. The 39 true pairs were categorized as high-, medium-,
and low-production frequency, following Holyoak and Glass's classification of
these same items. This production frequency factor was a within-subjects
variable, with stimulus pairs nested within frequency levels. In a similar
vein, false pairs were divided into high, low, and anomalous items, again
following Holyoak and Glass's classification.
Table 1 presentes mean True and False RTs from both the subjects and
items analysis. The RTs differ slightly for our two analyses because we have
Insert Table 1 about here
used unweighted means analysis. For the False items, both sets of means show
that RTs were fastest for anomalous pairs, next fastest for high-frequency
pairs, and slowest for low-frequency items. The overall difference among the
False means was significant at the .001 level (min F'(2,59) = 8.09), and
Newman-Keuls analyses showed all pairwise comparisons among these means to
be significant in both the analysis by items and that by subjects. This
finding contradicts that of Holyoak and Glass, who found no significant dif-
ferences between anomalous and high-frequency sentences. Evidence for dif-
ferences among the True means was more equivocal, as the min F' statistic
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showed no significant differences (min F'(2,59) = 1.86, p > .10). However,
the subjects analysis does indicate a difference among these means (see
Table 1), and a Newman-Keuls analysis over subjects found high-frequency
pairs to be faster than either medium- or low-frequency items. Further, a
test for the linear trend among the True means showed a marginally significant
effect (min F'(1,56) = 3.71, .05 < p < .10). The results for True RTs, then,
are in rough agreement with Holyoak and Glass, who found the same ordering of
means as we did.
The main discrepancy between Holyoak and Glass and our study concerns
the relation between anomalous and high-frequency statements. It is possible
that Holyoak and Glass failed to find a significant difference between these
statement types because they repeated subject-predicate pairs in an unbalanced
fashion. That is, considering both statements quantified by All and by Some
in Holyoak and Glass, 9 (out of 17) high-frequency items, 6 (of 20) low-
frequency items, and no anomalous items were repeated. If these repetitions
decreased RT, high-frequency statements may have been artifactually fast
relative to anomalous statements. In the present study, only statements
quantified by All were used, and for these statements, there were no
repetitions of subject-predicate pairs in the critical false statements.
Implications of Experiment 1. With respect to the two models of interest,
our results can be summarized as follows. In congruence with the Feature
Comaprison model, false items containing very unrelated nouns (the anomalous
pairs) were verified extremely rapidly. This finding is contrary to the
Marker Search model, which predicts relatively slow RTs to these pairs
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because of their low production frequencies. However, our experiment dupli-
cates Holyoak and Glass's important finding that low-frequency pairs are dis-
confirmed faster than high-frequency ones, despite the fact that high-
frequency items are also rated as more related in Holyoak and Glass's norms.
This finding is inconsistent with the Feature Comparison model, but in accord
with the assumptions of the Marker Search model. Hence the results contra-
dict some major predictions of both models. It seems that if we are to
salvage the Marker Search model we must explain away the data from anomalous
pairs. Alternatively, if we want to rescue the Feature Comparison model, we
must explain the relation between high- and low-frequency pairs.
Let us first consider some ways to salvage the Marker Search model.
Holyoak and Glass were aware of the problem that anomalous statements posed
for their model, since this problem manifested itself in their own data
(recall that they found anomalous statements were disconfirmed faster than
low-frequency ones even though both statement types had comparable production
frequencies). To reconcile these findings with their model, they proposed a
new "admittedly ad hoc" device to the theory, namely that "...certain abstract
types of information which differentiate between almost all words (such as the
distinction between 'living' and 'non-living') are uniformly accessed quickly"
(p. 237). Thus anomalous sentences should be disconfirmed quickly on the
basis of this abstract information. But this leaves us with a serious
question. If this abstract information is accessed rapidly, why do the
production frequencies collected by Holyoak and Glass show anomalous com-
pletions to be rare? If production frequency is truly an indicator of search
order, then anomalous completions should be fairly common, which is not the
Issues in Semantic Memory
43
case. Holyoak and Glass's reply is that "...production frequency may not be
a valid measure of the association strength of such abstract properties"
(p. 237), since these abstract concepts maynot correspond to single lexical
items in English and may be very rare in written or spoken language.
This explanation is not just ad hoc; it is almost surely incorrect.
First, it is unclear why the supposed low frequency or lexical form of
abstract predicates should result in low-production frequencies, since sub-
jects contributing to these norms are not called upon to encode or produce
these abstract terms at all. In order to produce an anomalous completion--
chairs to the stimulus frame All birds are ? --the subject must determine
that the superordinate pathways from <avian> and <chair> intersect at the
appropriate abstract concept, like <thing>, with identically labeled paths;
this is the only role played by the abstract concept. How quickly this can
be done should depend on the order in which the abstract concept is searched,
and this search order should not depend on factors like word frequency or
number of words in the lexicalization of the concept. For if it did, the
abstract concept involved should not be available quickly in verification
tasks either, and this leaves Glass and Holyoak without any way of accounting
for the falsification of anomalous statements. Second, abstract concepts need
not be infrequent in English. Take, Holyoak and Glass' example of an anom-1
alous statement, All birds are chairs. As we have just noted, disconfirming
this sentence requires us to find a common superordinate where the pathways
from the subject and predicate meet. Such a superordinate might be thing or
object (not living thing, as Holyoak and Glass assume since living thing is
the superordinate of the subject term only). Both thing and object have the
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advantage of being single lexical items and fairly common, at least in written
English (thing appears 333 times per million and object 65 time per million in
the Kucera-Francis, 1967, norms). Note, in addition, that the abstract term
thing will serve to disconfirm any anomalous sentence that is false by virtue
of one concept being animate and the other inainimate, as in the above example.
Third, the purpose of using production frequency as a predictor of RT was,
according to Glass and Holyoak, to provide empirical constraints on their
model. The importance of doing so, as they note, is that the Marker Search
model lacks any structural constraints on search order. But Holyoak and
Glass's abandonment of production frequency for abstract concepts seems to
leave the model without empirical constraints of search order as well,
allowing it to "predict" any RT results whatsoever. Thus the modification
proposed by Glass and Holyoak to account for findings on anomalous statements
is fraught with problems.
Now let us see what we can do to salvage the Feature Comparison model.
Recall that its problem is that it cannot account for why high-frequency
statements are disconfirmed faster than low-frequency ones. To get some
leverage on this problem, let us consider in detail some of the Holyoak and
Glass items. Low-frequency items included the sentences Some (All) women are
babies, Some (All) valleys are lakes, Some (All) flowers are foods. In
contrast to these difficult items, the high-frequency counterparts were
Some (All) women are men, Some (All) valleys are mountains, and Some (All)
flowers are trees. The subject and predicate concepts in both the high- and
low-frequency sentences share a fairly large number of semantic dimensions.
Women, men, and babies, for example, share those dimensions common to humans.
Issues in Semantic Memory
45
However, the subject-predicate pairs in high-frequency items (e.g., women-
men) seem to possess directly opposing values on at least one shared dimension
(sex, in our example). While it is possible to find such opposing values for
the subjects and predicates of low-frequency pairs, the relationship is not
as clear-cut. Thus, while women and babies may differ on the dimension of
age, this difference depends on interpreting women in its most specific sense
(woman as adult human female) rather than its more general one (woman as human
female). This is the kind of intuition that led Glass and Holyoak to formulate
the Marker Search model, and we concur that it is an important insight. The
task for us is to determine some way of accommodating this intuition into the
Feature Comparison model.
There are at least two ways of making this accommodation. The first is
to change the model by adding some new content to the second stage. Specif-
ically we may assume that this stage terminates as soon as any mismatching
feature is found, and that a mismatching feature will be found sooner with
high- than low-frequency statements. To use our previous example, the mis-
matching feature of sex may be found relatively quickly when comparing women
and men, while the mismatching feature of age may be found relatively slowly
when contrasting women and babies. Of course, added assumptions are of
limited value unless they lead to new predictions, but the present assumption
seems testable. It seems to predict faster confirmation times for the true
statements Women are female and Men are male, than for Women are adults and
Babies are nonadults. This seems like a reasonable prediction. But, alas,
there are other problems with this approach. In addition to our assumptions
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about self-termination, we must further assume that the faster second-stage
processing of high- than low-frequency statements more than compensates for
the greater likelihood of having to execute the second for high-frequency
items (recall they have higher related values). While the small difference
in relatedness between the high- and low-frequency completions argues for
the viability of this approach, it is not an altogether satisfactory one
without an explicit quantitative model.
Alternatively, we can accommodate the findings on high- and low-frequency
pairs by altering our conception of first-stage processing, particularly of
how one computes a relatedness value. We may assume that, in our Experiment 1,
for example, when a subject computed the relatedness value, he gave more weight
to dimensions with widely discrepant values than to dimensions with similar
values. In this way, pairs like women-men would have been computed as less
related than women-babies because of the extra weight given to the dimension
of sex which differentiates the first pair. This method of computing related-
ness may differ from that used by those subjects who contributed to the
ratings, and were asked to rate "how closely you feel that two words are
associated in meaning" (Holyoak and Glass's method, and our own). For in the
latter situation, subjects may be inclined to give equal weight to all shared
dimensions. This same ambiguity with respect to relatedness judgments has
been noted by Fillenbaum (1973) in connection with multidimensional scaling
techniques. To borrow Fillenbaum's example, the judged similarity of
antonymous pairs like hot and cold will depend heavily on whether subjects
attend more to the dimensions having similar values or to those having
different values.
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Again, we would like our proposed modification of the Feature Comparison
model to lead to some new prediction(s). One such prediction is the following.
If new rating instructions can be devised that induce subjects to emphasize
dimensions having widely discrepant values, then this set of ratings should
accurately predict the ordering of False RTs in Experiment 1. We attempted
to test this prediction in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: An alternative procedure for measuring relatedness. We
asked 29 Stanford undergraduates to rate the relatedness of the subject-
predicate pairs used in Holyoak and Glass's disjoint statements, by deter-
mining "...how easy it would be for the subject term to become the predicate."
Our presumption was that such instructions would emphasize the importance of
shared dimensions with discrepant values. The 63 distinct subject-predicate
pairs were presented to the raters in a randomized list, and the raters were
asked to produce a rating on a 10-point scale for each pair, with low values
denoting more related items.
The results of this experiment may be summarized easily. The low-
frequency pairs were now judged to be the most related, the high-frequency
items next most related, and the anomalous statements least related of all.
These relatedness ratings, then, display the same ordering as the RTs of
Experiment 1, with relatedness being directly related to disconfirmation times
as predicted by the Feature Comparison model. This was the case for both
the set of items quantified by Some (used in the Holyoak and Glass study)
and for the set quantified by All (used by Holyoak and Glass and by us in
Experiment 1). For the former set, mean ratings were 4.20 for low-frequency
Issues in Semantic Memory
48
items, 4.54 for high frequency, and 7.71 for anomalous pairs (remember--
low numbers mean high relatedness). For the latter set of items, means were
3.03 for low frequency, 4.43 for high frequency, and 7.11 for anomalous pairs.
Differences between these means were significant in both cases, with F'(2,53)
= 30.08, p < .01 for Some items, and F'(2,48) = 27.20, p < .01 for All items.
Newman-Keuls tests showed that each of the pairwise differences within the
two sets were significant, except for that between the high- and low-frequency
pairs for statements quantified by Some.
So the Feature Comparison model is consistent with the pattern of means
obtained in Experiment 1 as long as we assume that the relatedness value
computed in the first stage mirrors the relatedness judgments provided by our
subjects in Experiment 2. The relatedness norms collected by Holyoak and
Glass fail to predict the results of Experiment 1 because their ratings
reflected only the overall proportion of shared dimensions. Ratings of this
kind have proved successful in earlier studies (e.g., Rips et al., 1973;
Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974), possibly because the false items used in the earlier
studies did not discriminate between the two sorts of relatedness. These
conclusions, however, need further scrutiny. Introducing yet another measure
of the semantic relation between subject and predicate nouns may raise as
many problems as it solves. Many types of ratings have been found to
correlate with RTs for semantic memory judgments (e.g., co-occurrence ratings,
production frequencies, relatedness ratings), and all of these measures are
intercorrelated. So additional experiments and analyses are needed to tease
apart the critical differences between these measures, and additional thought
must be given to the factors responsible for the differences. Perhaps such
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studies will show us that different measures all tap different, but equally
important, semantic aspects, for there is surely no reason to think that
there is one best measure of semantic processing.
Disconfirming Superset and Overlap Statements
The Holyoak and Glass results. There is one last set of findings due
to Holyoak and Glass that we must still deal with. These findings involve
RTs to false superset statements, e.g., All women are mothers, and false
overlap statements, e.g., All women are writers, (what Holyoak and Glass call
Counterexample statements). As we noted earlier, the Marker Search model
assumes that these types of sentences are disconfirmed by a search for a
subset of the subject category that is disjoint with the predicate category,
as indicated by identically labeled pathways. The Feature Comparison model
would disconfirm these kinds of statements in the same way it falsifies dis-
joint statements, that is, by finding mismatching features. Again the two
models differ in the predictions they make about the disconfirmations of
interest. But to see this, we need to examine the Holyoak and Glass study
in detail.
In their study of how superset and overlap statements were disconfirmed,
Holyoak and Glass's experimental strategy again involved finding cases where
production frequency and relatedness ratings make discrepant predictions for
False RTs. But in this case, Holyoak and Glass's frequency measure of
interest is obtained by somewhat indirect means. Instead of using the fre-
quency of completions that make a sentence frame false (the procedure used for the
disjoint statements previously discussed), Holyoak and Glass use the frequency
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of completions that make the corresponding Some statement true. (Note that
a superset or overlap statement is true when quantified by Some; it is only
false when quantified by All). For example, to predict RTs for disconfir-
mations of sentences like All fruits are oranges, Holyoak and Glass used
completions of the frame Some fruits are ? that serve to make the sentence
true. In theory, the higher the frequency of the Some completion, the faster
one can disconfirm the corresponding false All statement. If, for example,
apples is a high frequency completion to Some fruits are ? , then apples is
readily accessible from fruits, and rejection of All fruits are oranges
should be fast. This follows from the Marker Search model's hypothesis that
such sentences are disconfirmed by a "back-up" search from the subject term
(fruits) that finds a category (apples) that is disjoint with the predicate
term (oranges).
The results showed significant effects on False RT of these true-
completion frequencies. However, the False RTs showed no significant effects
of production frequency of the false sentences themselves. For example,
reaction time to disconfirm a sentence like All fruits are oranges was
unaffected by the frequency with which subjects generate oranges to the
frame All fruits-are ? when asked to make the sentence false. This contrasts
with the finding obtained for disjoint statements. Also, according to the
norms collected by Holyoak and Glass, ratings of semantic relatedness co-
incided with the frequency of false completions, so they likewise failed to
predict the False RTs. Holyoak and Glass note, however, that a significant
residual effect of relatedness remains when the true-completion frequencies
are controlled.
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Holyoak and Glass conclude that these findings support the Marker Search
model, because the model correctly predicts that False RTs should decrease
with true-completion frequencies. They further conclude that the results
conflict with the Feature Comparison model, because the latter cannot account
for the effects of true-completion frequencies. We disagree, as we think the
findings pose difficulties for both models. Consider first the Marker Search
model. The problem here is how to explain the lack of effect of false-
completion frequency. Surely, according to this model, false completions to
All fruits are ? indicate the order in which pathways are searched from
fruit, as this search must locate not only a potential predicate, like orange,
but also another subset of fruit, like apple, that is disjoint with the
potential predicate. For if this last step were omitted, it would be
impossible to determine that the potential predicate actually made the
sentence false. Thus the search needed to produce a false superset or over-
lap completion mirrors the search necessary to disconfirm the completed
sentence. By the usual Marker Search logic, this should mean that these
completion frequencies will predict RTs for the corresponding full sentences,
and this is contrary to the obtained findings. Although Holyoak and Glass
seem to dismiss this implication from their model, we think it provides an
important disconfirmation of their theory.
Now consider the Feature Comparison model. The problem here is how to
account for the effect of true-completion frequency on False RTs, since
Holyoak and Glass were able to demonstrate that this effect was independent
of rated relatedness. We could proceed as we did before, and attempt to add
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some new assumptions to our theory so as to make it consistent with the
problematic effect. In this case, however, we think this approach is
unnecessary at this point in time. For we dispute the very claim that the
effect of true-completion frequency has been adequately demonstrated, because
there are two methodological problems with this study that undermine its
principal finding.
First, it appears that several of the items in the critical set were
simply misclassified by Holyoak and Glass. (All of the items are listed in
their Appendix.) For example, the sentence All fruits are citrus is listed
as one for which there was no high-frequency true-completion to Some fruits
are ? that was disjoint with citrus. However, apple, listed as a high-
frequency true-completion, seems to fill the role of such a disjoint predicate.
A similar problem applies to All birds are swimmers, which was also classified
as having no high-frequency true-completion associated with it; here robins
seems to be such a completion. Removing just these two items from the
critical sentences reduces the overall difference from 109 to 76 msec. This
reduced effect is not significant over either subjects (F(1,13) = 3.41,
p < .05) or items (F(1,20) = 2.51, p < .10). However, the effect is still in
the right direction, and it might prove significant in future experiments
that involve more subjects and more items. So while this problem is somewhat
serious, it may not be that severe.
The second methodological problem is more bothersome. Holyoak and Glass
did not control for the type of set relation within their critical sentences
(those where true-completion frequency and relatedness were unconfounded).
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That is, for the critical sentences, 8 of the 12 items with high true-
completion frequencies were superset statements while the remainder were
overlaps; in contrast, only 3 of 12 items with low true-completions were
superset statements while the rest were overlaps (see Holyoak & Glass, Foot-
note 4). Thus true-completion frequency was confounded with the prevalence of
superset statements. If we assume that superset statements can be confirmed
faster than their overlap counterparts, we have come up with an alternative
explanation of the problematic result. Experiment 3 provides support for
this assumption.
Experiment 3: Differences between superset and overlap statements.
Thirteen subjects (Stanford undergraduates) were given 150 statements to
verify, all of the form All S are P. Half the statements were true, and
half false. The false items contained 25 disjoint, 25 superset, and 25
overlap statements, and these three statement-types were equated for average
subject-predicate relatedness as determined by previously obtained ratings.
Also, the average relatedness of subject-predicate pairs in the false state-
ments (6.5 on a scale of 1-10, where high numbers indicate similar meanings)
was roughly equal to the average relatedness of subject-predicate pairs in
true statements (6.9). Each statement was presented only once, and there
were no repetitions of words across the 150 statements.
Each full statement was typed in uppercase Orator in a single line on
a 6" x 9" white index card. Subjects were simply instructed to decide
whether the statement was True or False. The same random ordering of the
150 statements was used with all subjects. The statements were presented
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in an Iconix three-field tachistoscope at a viewing distance of 68 cm, and
each item was preceded by a 1 sec fixation point. The response panel con-
tained three telegraph keys arranged horizontally. The middle key was used by
the subject to initiate each trial, while the left and right keys were used
to indi'cate True and False responses. All subjects used the key corresponding
to their dominant hand to indicate true decisions.
The False RTs are the only ones of interest, and they were analyzed
across both items and subjects. For the subjects analysis, disjoint statements
were disconfirmed fastest (1510 msec), superset statements next fastest (1575
msec), and overlap statements were slowest of all (1721 msec). The overall
effect of set relation was significant at p < .01, with F(2,48) = 9.67.
Furthermore, subsequent planned comparisons showed that overlap statements
were significantly slower than superset statements, F(1,48) = 14.49, p < .01,
while the superset and disjoint statement-types were not significantly dif-
ferent from one another, F(1,48) = 2.87, p < .1. For the items analysis,
the mean RTs for disjoint, superset, and overlap statements were 1506, 1580,
and 1680, respectively; the effect of set relation was marginally significant,
F(2,144) = 2.42, .05 < p < .10. While a planned comparison did not reveal
a significant difference between overlap and superset sentences, F = 2.34,
.10 < p < .20, the difference between them is of course in the expected
direction, and the magnitude of the difference (100 msec) is relatively
substantial for this kind of experiment. Lastly, the error rate on overlap
statements (24%) was far greater than that on superset statements (8%),
t(12) = 4.35, p < .001.
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All things considered, these results indicate that overlap statements
are harder to process than their superset counterparts, and this provides an
alternative explanation of the Holyoak and Glass results. Thus there is no
clear-cut evidence in the Holyoak-Glass study for the effects of true-
completion frequency, or for what they have called "disconfirmation by
counterexample." As we see it, this reduces the credibility of their
theoretical claims.
How do the present results line up with the Feature Comparison model?
It seems that they remove one problem for the model--the need to explain the
effect of true-completion frequency on False RTs--and create a new one--the
need to explain the effects of set relation on False RTs. That is, there is
nothing in the Feature Comparison model that would lead us to expect that
False RT should increase from disjoint to superset to overlap statements,
when all three statement-types are equated for relatedness. Before trying
to add some new assumptions to our model to account for these new results,
it is helpful to localize the effects of set relation within the processes
of the model. Two aspects of Experiment 3 suggest that set relation affected
only the second stage of the model. First, all three statement-types were
equated for relatedness, and, in terms of the model, this means that all
false statements were equally likely to require second-stage processing.
Second, as previously noted, true and false statements had roughly the same
level of subject-predicate relatedness, and, according to the model, this
means that many of the True-False decisions must have been based on second-
stage processing (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Smith, Rips & Shoben, 1974).
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We also have additional evidence that argues for a second-stage locus of
the effect of set relation. To appreciate this evidence, consider the con-
sequences of changing the quantifier used in Experiment 3 from All to Some.
We have argued elsewhere that Some statements probably require a different
second stage than that used in verifying All statements (Smith, Rips &
Shoben, 1974). Essentially, this is due to the fact that the second stage
used will All statements establishes a subset relation, and Some statements
are true even when they manifest only a superset or overlap relation. Con-
sequently, if the set-relation effect is due to the second stage, then this
effect might not obtain if the quantifier is switched from All to Some.
Accordingly, we basically redid Experiment 3 using Some as the quantifier.
(To insure that True and False responses were still equally probable, we used
only 25 subset statements and increased the number of disjoint statements to
75.) The results were simple. There was no longer any effect at all of set
relation. If we restrict our attention to the 25 disjoint, superset, and
overlap statements that were previously used in Experiment 3, the new means
are as follows: for the subject analysis, disjoint = 1482 msec, superset =
1494 msec, and overlap = 1499msec, F(2,48) < 1; for the items analysis,
disjoint = 1502 msec, superset = 1522 msec, and overlap = 1517 msec, F(2,48)
< 1. These results, then, line up with the notion that the set-relation
effect of Experiment 3 was due to the second stage.
To explain why second-stage processing is faster for disjoint and
superset statements than for overlap ones, it seems we must assume this stage
is self-terminating. Disjoint statements would then be disconfirmed rapidly
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if we further assume that general features, like being animate or being alive,
are compared first since most of our disjoint pairs differed on these features.
(Note that this differs from the Holyoak and Glass assumption about general
features being accessed first, since we hold that such features only become
available after an extensive amount of processing--the first stage--has been
completed.) There is some support for our assumptions in Shoben (1974),
where disjoint noun-pairs were disconfirmed faster when they differed on
general features rather than just specific ones. Shoben, though, did not
establish that this effect was independent of relatedness, so our assumptions
should be considered speculative until further research is done.
It is somewhat more difficult to come up with an explanation of why
second-stage processing should be faster for superset than overlap noun-pairs,
as both types of noun pairs contained virtually no mismatches on general
features. There is, however, one notable difference between the sets of
defining features for superset and overlap pairs. In superset pairs the
predicate term should contain more features than the subject term (as the
predicate term is in fact a subset of the subject), while this imbalance
need not hold in overlap pairs. Detection of this imbalance would provide
sufficient grounds for disconfirming a statement, for obviously all the
features of the predicate cannot be found among those of the subject if there
are more features in the predicate to begin with. Thus it is possible that
superset statements were processed faster than overlap ones because the
subjects of Experiment 3 were sensitive to this imbalance, and terminated
their second-stage processing as soon as the imbalance was detected. This is
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a very ad hoc assumption, and again further research will be needed to
determine if it has any merit.
To summarize, Experiment 3 appears to undermine the results of Glass and
Holyoak on true-completion frequencies (Counterexamples, in their terminology);
it also leads to some new problems for the Feature Comparison model, problems
that call for further embellishments of the proposed second stage.
Summary and Future Directions
We began with an attempt to classify semantic-memory models, and after
considering various unsatisfactory classifications, we proposed a distinction
between Computation and Pre-storage models. Computation models, of which the
Feature Comparison model is a current exemplar, emphasize semantic expansion
of terms during sentence verification, and account for RT effects in verifi-
cation experiments by means of variations in the time needed for comparison
operations between these expanded concepts. Obtained effects of relatedness
or typicality are explained by similarities among the elements of the expanded
concepts. Pre-storage models, such as the Marker Search model, explain RT
effects in terms of variations in search procedures that operate on a data-
base of stored (usually interconnected) propositions. Typicality and kindred
phenomena are explained away by means of co-occurrence frequency.
What is the current status of these models, in light of the evidence
reviewed here? Much of this evidence related indirectly to the question of
whether RT effects are best ascribed to search or comparison processes. But
though we were able to offer a detailed contrast between a theory emphasizing
comparison processes (the Feature Comparison model) and one emphasizing search
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processes (the Marker Search model), we are not able to settle the comparison
vs. search issue in any final way. There is no decisive empirical result
that infirms either theory. This is not so much because semantic-memory
research has uncovered no interesting facts, but rather because the models
have been retrenched in an effort to account for the new facts. As a result,
one of the outstanding questions is whether the revised models are too general
to be testable, a problem that seems to be particularly acute for Pre-storage
models (Glass & Holyoak, and particularly Collins & Loftus, 1975). For these
models, there are no structural constraints at all on search order. Even
the empirical constraints proposed by Glass and Holyoak can be by-passed by
invoking extra mechanisms like those needed to account for disconfirming
anomalous sentences. For Computation models, one of the important remaining
problems is to specify the mechanics of the comparison process through
further discriminating experiments; hopefully the present Experiments 1-3
begin to do this.
With respect to an explanation for typicality effects, we seem to be
on firmer ground. There is no evidence whatsoever for the role of co-
occurrence frequency, at least when frequency is measured in an objective
way (as in our reanalysis of Anderson & Reder, 1974, or in Rosch et al., 1976).
Although dependence on co-occurrence frequency is a relatively peripheral
feature of Pre-storage models, the lack of evidence for co-occurrence
frequency leaves these models without a principled explanation for their own
structural organization. For example, the Marker Search model is left without
any theoretical underpinning for its short-cut pathways or search order,
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beyond the sheer need to account for the data. By contrast, those Compu-
tation models that take featural similarity as their starting point, have
little difficulty in coping with typicality effects and other related
phenomena. Instead, the problems faced by the latter models have to do with
specifying the status of the features themselves, and the boundary conditions
on feature combinations and feature comparisons.
Of course the issues contended by Computation and Pre-storage models do
not exhaust the range of questions concerning psychological semantics. Nor
do we need to resolve the former before pursuing the latter. For example,
little experimentation has been done on rules for combining propositions
semantically in complex sentences, and to our knowledge, no semantic-memory
model has even explicitly addressed this problem. While we have done some
preliminary work in this area (Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1975), there is no way
at present to evaluate semantic-memory models on this issue. Similarly, most
current models of semantic memory have been content to divide sentences into
property statements (e.g., Oranges are round) and class inclusion statements
(e.g., Oranges are fruit). But among the so-called property statements are
a wealth of distinct semantic types, including modals (Oranges can roll),
sentences with relative adjectives (Oranges are small), and sentences with
complex verbs (Oranges grow). We know from linguistic and philosophical
analyses that such sentences contain important semantic characteristics, yet
we have no evidence at all concerning psychological distinctions among them.
It seems to us that semantic memory has nothing to lose by dealing with a
broader range of phenomena.
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2
All further references to Glass and Holyoak are to this paper.
Similarly, references to Holyoak and Glass refer to Holyoak and Glass (1975).
3The problems that we have just discussed all stem from the procedure of
assigning mutually exclusive subsets the same marker. One could argue that,
rather than relying on this kind of procedure, we need instead to use our
intuitions to decide when two paths are contradictory. The difficulties with
this solution are obvious: it forgoes any a priori determination of contra-
dictory pairs, and it may not lead to many predictions if intuitions about
contradictions are not clear-cut. Both of these problems could eventuate in
a theoretical formulation that lacks testability.
4
It is possible to maintain that other measures of production frequency
would have been more appropriate. Our choice was dictated by the availability
of the Battig-Montague entries for the items used by Anderson and Reder (1974)
and by the role that these norms have played in previous studies of semantic
memory (e.g., Wilkins, 1971).
5There are some additional results from our correlational analysis that
deserve comment. First, both production frequency and typicality ratings
correlated with True RTs, r(70) = -.23, .05 < p < .10, and r(70) = -.25,
p < .05, respectively. Neither of these findings is the least bit novel (see
Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974), though both correlations are surprisingly low in
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light of previous results. Second, there was also a marginal positive
correlation between typicality ratings and the KF count, r(70) = .21, .05 <
p < .10. This result conflicts with the negative correlation of Rosch et al.
(1976) that was just mentioned in the text. But the conflict may be more
apparent than real, since the instance-category pairs of Rosch et al. covered
a wider typicality range than did those of Anderson and Reder. So the Rosch
et al. results may be the more sensitive ones. Finally we should mention
that we performed a step-wise multiple regression of RT on the entire set of
independent variables discussed above, plus measures of simple word frequency
(determined by the standard Kucera and Francis norms). Typicality ratings
entered the regression equation first, and of the remaining variables only the
word frequency of the instance term showed even a marginally significant
correlation with RT, r(69) = -.21, .05 < p < .10. Thus, typicality ratings
taken together with instance word frequency seem to provide the best account
of the RT data, R = .32, F(2,69) = 3.96, p < .05.
Glass and Holyoak argue this in terms of Sternberg's (1969) Additive
Factors method. We feel that invoking the Additive Factors method here may
be something of a red herring. In the Feature Comparison model, the output
of the first stage (the semantic relatedness value) directly affects the
duration of the second stage; this means that if relatedness is manipulated
experimentally, its effect will interact with any factor (e.g., category size)
that influences the second stage. The Feature Comparison model, therefore,
cannot be faulted for lack of additive effects between relatedness and cate-
gory size since none are predicted. Of course, it may be possible to find
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some third variable that influences the duration of the first stage without
changing the relatedness value, and if so, this factor should produce
additive effects with second stage variables.
7We could equally well assume that relatedness depends on the propor-
tion of the second item's features that are shared. This in no way affects
the present argument.
8More specifically, the estimate of the category size effect derived
from the analysis of covariance is obtained by fitting an equation of the
following form to the reaction time data (ignoring error):
RT.. = t + t . + b(X.. - 7). (a)
-- U -mean -size. - j -
RT.. is the reaction time to verify sentence j with predicate category size
i, and X.. is the relatedness rating for the same sentence. Here, t is
-- l -mean
the overall mean RT, X is the mean relatedness rating, and t . is the
-- 
--size.
effect of category size. By contrast, the model proposed by Smith, Shoben,
and Rips (1974, Equations 3 and 6) is more complex, and predicts True reaction
times as:
RT.. = t + t .
-- L -mean -si ze.
bX. . - a, ) - _(c - -•Xij - - , )
1-(-- -a, (b)1 - (c - bX.. - a )
where D represents the normal distribution function, and ba,   o, and c_1
are parameters of the model. A similar equation obtains for False reaction
times. The relationship between reaction time, relatedness ratings, and the
estimate of the category size effect is clearly different in the two models,
Issues in Semantic Memory
68
and consequently, there is no reason to suppose that the estimates of t .
will be equivalent.
9 At one point, Glass and Holyoak argue that the results for anomalous
statements are not critical to their model because they wish to restrict
their theory to explanations of high- and low-frequency statements. We are
not convinced that this restriction is a principled one, and so we will
consider the results for anomalous statements.
Interestingly, though these results fail to replicate the Holyoak and
Glass results for anomalous statements, they do replicate an earlier study
of Glass et al. (1974). These authors, using noun-property statements rather
than noun-pairs, found that anomalous statements were disconfirmed faster
than high-frequency statements, which in turn were faster than their low-
frequency counterparts.
To keep matters comparable to Holyoak and Glass, relatedness was
determined by ratings of "closeness in meaning"--the standard procedure. As
an afterthought, we also measured relatedness by the ratings used in
Experiment 2; these ratings also showed that the superset and overlap state-
ments were equal in relatedness.
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Table 1
Results from Analyses of Variance of True and False Responses
Treating Either Items (Items-analysis) or Subjects (Subjects-
analysis) as a Random Variable while Averaging Across the Other
Trues
Hi-PF Med-PF Lo-PF F df p
Subjects-analysis 986 1045 1089 8.14 2,38 <.005
Items-analysis 979 1050 1112 2.41 2,36 n.s.
min F'(2,59) = 1.86, p > .10
Falses
High Low Anomalous F df p
Subjects-analysis 1103 1248 998 38.58 2,38 <.001
Items-analysis 1136 1266 1001 10.24 2,36 <.001
min F' (2,59) = 8.09, p < .001
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Two simple models of semantic memory--the Attribute and
Hierarchical models.
Figure 2. An illustration of the Marker Search model. Lower-case
letters designate the labels on relations.
Figure 3. Illustrative cases of labeling contradictions.
Figure 4. Illustration of labeling and short-cut paths.
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